Thursday, October 16, 2014

U.S. Boots On The Ground In Iraq, Advisers Deployed To Anbar And Diyala

 
The Obama administration has pointed out that it needs local security forces in Iraq to turn around the security situation in the country, as air power alone cannot do it. The U.S. just took the first step in that direction. The 1st Infantry Division headquarters is being sent to Iraq for an advisory mission, and three units have been deployed to bases in Anbar and Diyala.

On September 25, 2014 it was announced that the 1st Infantry Division headquarters was being sent to Iraq to train the Iraqi forces. Earlier in the month 475 troops were deployed for advising the ISF. They are just now being sent out into the field. One unit arrived in Karkush base in central Diyala on October 15. That same day 100 U.S. advisers arrived in Al Taqadum base outside of Habaniya, which is situated between Ramadi and Fallujah, and to Al-Assad that is outside Baghdadi and to the south of Haditha. That last base is a dangerous one. The day before it was reported that the Islamic State had attacked Al-Assad. It was also assaulting neighboring Baghdadi from two directions. This is part of IS’s on going campaign to seize all of Anbar. That could mean that these new advisers will not only come under fire, but might have to return it as well. President Obama has said that he is not sending ground forces to Iraq, but these forward advisors might end up in combat.

Security in Anbar is dire with the Islamic State having seized much of the center of the province in the last few days. The local council and governor have desperately asked Baghdad for aid and assistance, and recently called for U.S. troops to be sent there to help reverse the situation. Part of their wishes has now been met. American advisers are in two bases in the center of the governorate, which is where the heaviest fighting is now taking place. This is the first substantive move by the Obama administration to build up local forces on the ground, which is what is necessary to really turn back the insurgency. On the other hand, training the ISF and tribes is a long-term process, and Anbar may not have that much time. A spate of towns and cities has just fallen, and IS is pushing hard on seizing other areas including Al-Assad base. That means American troops are in harms, and there could be casualties. Hundreds more advisers also need to be sent to Iraq if the U.S. has any real hope of turning around the Iraqi forces so this is only a baby step in that direction. Still, Anbar is one of the main battlefronts in Iraq and something has to be done there to save the province from falling. These advisers could be a step in that direction.

SOURCES

Arabic CNN, “Anbar police chief for CNN: Daash caught one of the largest air bases..and the Alliance performs 21 raids with the participation of Saudis on Kobani,” 10/14/14

Harper, Jon, “Army sending division HQ element to Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, 9/25/14

National Iraqi News Agency, “Anbar provincial council: /100/ American military personnel arrived to the province to train the security forces and the sons of the tribes,” 10/15/14
- “Breaking News….The Islamic State attacks Haditha district from two directions,” 10/14/14

Shafaq News, “Security official reveals the tasks of American advisers in Diyala,” 10/15/14

Wednesday, October 15, 2014

Update On Security In Iraq’s Anbar Province


Since the Islamic State’s (IS) gains in central Anbar at the beginning of October 2014 it has continued its campaign to take the entire province. It has seized another army base, several small towns, and is now assaulting Ramadi, Haditha, Baghdadi, which is the home to several major Iraqi Security Forces bases, and a couple other areas. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and allied tribes are fighting back, but they find themselves outside looking in on many of Anbar’s urban centers.

After the fall of Hit in western Anbar it looked like the Iraqi Security Forces were collapsing across the center of the province. Hit was taken on October 2, which was the start of a string of victories for the Islamic State. Three days later the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) suddenly withdrew from Ramadi to the Anbar Operations Command center outside of the city without a fight. Sources told Al Mada that Ramadi was almost barren of police and soldiers. It appeared then that the insurgents had finally seized the provincial capital. That same day IS pushed the ISF out of the area north of Fallujah to the Salahaddin border forcing them back to Samarra. Garma, Albu Khanafar, Muhammadawi, Kubaisa, Abu Risha, Albu Ali Jassim, Albu Fahd, and other small towns all came under militant control. October 7 IS returned to Haditha, which it had failed to take the previous month. In just a few days it looked like the insurgency had the ISF on the run. Most of central and northeast Anbar appeared to have been captured. Even if there were still outposts in the area they were cut off from their supply lines due to the Islamic State’s gains.

The Anbar council had been warning of the dire security situation in the province for weeks. It demanded that Baghdad send more arms, forces, and air assets immediately. It also called for the removal of the head of the Anbar Operations Command General Rasheed Flayh who they blamed for all of the defeats. The deputy head of council told the press that the whole province could go under in days if the central government didn’t react. As Anbar Governor Ahmed Dulaimi told Musings On Iraq, local politicians had been frustrated for a long time by the lack of training, professionalism, and corruption within the security forces. More importantly there appeared to be no strategy on how to retake and hold the lost territories from the militants.

Despite the stinging reverses the Iraqi Security Forces did attempt to counter attack. After its sudden withdrawal from Ramadi it moved back into northern and central parts of the city. The ISF was also trying to secure the areas around Fallujah, Ramadi, and Hit, while launching attacks upon Garma. The United Sates even carried out air strikes to break up insurgent forces massing around Haditha. Still, due to its retreats the army and police only hold around 40% of Ramadi. In the other major cities and towns it is mostly on the perimeter seeking ways to re-enter them.

The initiative is still with the Islamic State and the insurgency. On October 12, the Anbar police commander General Ahmed Dulaimi was killed in Abu Risha by an IED. On October 13, IS took another army base outside of Hit after three days of fighting. The ISF claimed it made a “tactical withdrawal”, but the fact they left most of their equipment and supplies behind makes it appear like it was another rout. That same day IS seized a Federal Police base north of Hit, expanded its control in the surrounding villages, and began assaults on Khalidiya in between Fallujah and Ramadi, and upon Amiriya Fallujah near the Babil border. It continues a major drive upon Haditha with the council head there saying that the town needed immediate help or the city would fall. October 14 it started attacking Baghdadi, which is to the southwest of Haditha and the neighboring Al-Assad air base. This is also the home of the 7th Division and the Jazeera Operations Command headquarters. The Islamic State continues to gain neighborhoods in Ramadi as well. After its earlier victories IS now attempting to seize all of Anbar. It is attacking up and down the entire length of the province, and the ISF and tribes have not been able to stop them.

Anbar remains one of the main battlefronts in Iraq since fighting started there at the very end of 2013. The struggle there has gone in fits and spurts. Many towns have gone back and forth between government and insurgent control, but then there have been times where the anti-Baghdad forces have made major gains. The last time was in June when the ISF unexpectedly withdrew from all along the Syrian border when Mosul and Tikrit fell. Then things seemed to settle down again only for the Islamic State to go on the offensive in August. It didn’t seem like its plans were going so well as it failed to take Haditha its main target. Then Hit was taken, and the militants surged across much of central Anbar. Now the entire province is threatened. The fact that the ISF still appear hapless in most areas does not bode well for the future. They have broken again and again in just a few days. Both Baghdad and the American led coalition need to intervene in a much more determined fashion to reverse the situation, because even if places like Ramadi and Haditha are able to hold on they are cut off from their supply lines and need to be supplied by air something the government forces are not good at. If not there could be more bad news coming out of western Iraq very soon.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Anbar Operations announces the liberation of Warrar area north of Ramadi from “Daash,”” 10/8/14

Arabic CNN, “Anbar police chief for CNN: Daash caught one of the largest air bases..and the Alliance performs 21 raids with the participation of Saudis on Kobani,” 10/14/14

Cunningham, Erin, “Islamic State fighters are threatening to overrun Iraq’s Anbar province,” Washington Post, 10/9/14

Daragahi, Borzou, “Isis fighters seize key military base in Iraq’s Anbar province,” Financial Times, 10/13/14

Al Mada, “Administration Anbar: Daash controls limited areas of Ramadi and military operations are continuing to expel them,” 10/6/14
-“Anbar makes renewed claim to the federal government to expedite the arming of the security forces to enable them to respond to Daash,” 10/5/14
- “Anbar police: Flow of 400 Daash with vehicles and arms across the border from Syria to Anbar,” 10/8/14
- “Army troops withdraw from the city of Ramadi and stationed in Anbar Operations Command headquarters north of the city,” 10/5/14
- “Daash controls the area north of Fallujah linked with Samarra,” 10/5/14

Mamoun, Abdelhak, “URGENT: ISIS seizes 3rd largest military base in western Iraq and takes its tanks, heavy weapons and supplies,” Iraq News, 10/14/14

National Iraqi News Agency, “Anbar Operations Command announces the IS control on Hit training camp after “tactical” withdrawal of military units,” 10/13/14
- “Breaking News….Army, backed by tribesmen, foil armed attack on Haditha district, in Anbar,” 10/7/14
- “Breaking News….The Islamic State attacks Haditha district from two directions,” 10/14/14
- “Chairman of the Provincial Council of Anbar announces the entry of more than /5/ thousands terrorists from Syria to the province,” 10/11/14
- “The IS organization controls the area /Zekhaikha/ north of Hit,” 10/11/14
- “The Islamic State controls two cities west of Anbar province,” 10/5/14
- “Liberating the /Towi/ area north of Ramadi from the IS control,” 10/11/14
- “Security Forces, Backed by Tribesmen, Free Two Villages in Fallujah,” 10/8/14
- “Two villages, north of Hit district, freed,” 10/9/14

New Sabah, “Anbar Council: We have 5 cities battling Daash fiercely,” 10/13/14

Radio Free Iraq, “06 October 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, “ 10/6/14
- “12 October 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 10/12/14
- “13 October 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 10/13/14
- “14 October 2014,” Daily Updates from Anbar, 10/14/14

Shafaq News, “ISIS terrorists control Heet entire camp and the neighboring regions,” 10/13/14

Tuesday, October 14, 2014

Car Bomb Trends In Iraq 2012-2014

 
Car Bombs, also known as Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) are one of the main weapons of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq. It is not only a weapon of terror to kill civilians and incite sectarian tensions, it is also increasingly used as a tactical weapon to attack the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), infrastructure like bridges, and government offices. The ebb and flow in VBIED attacks since 2012 impart the changing tactics and strategies of the Islamic State.  

Remains of Oct 11, 2014 double car bomb attack upon Baghdad’s Shula (AP)

The beginning of 2012 was when the Islamic State was attempting to make a comeback after its nadir in 2011. The U.S. and Iraqi forces had seriously degraded the capabilities of the organization having killed 34 of the group’s 43 top leaders. After the U.S. military withdrew in December, IS launched a series of car bombs in January and February to let the country know that is was still around. It set off 26 in January over the course of 12 days and then 23 in February in only seven days. In January the main target was Baghdad with ten explosions, followed by four in Ninewa, and three in Babil. The first was on January 5 when Shiite pilgrims were hit in Baghdad’s Kadhimiya killing 16 and wounding another 36 with two VBIEDs. The next day four car bombs went off, three in Baghdad and one in Karbala with pilgrims again singled out leaving behind 24 dead and 94 wounded. These were the typical forms of these attacks going after civilians, especially Shiites to sow terror and cause sectarian tensions. It also showed that IS was the only insurgent group with the capabilities to strike southern Iraq with the bombing in Karbala. The first car bomb wave of the year lasting from January 12 to 16 showed that was not all these devices were used for. On January 15 IS attempted to storm the government complex in downtown Ramadi, which began with a suicide car bomb to break the defenses. The month finished off with five VBIEDs on January 24 again targeting Shiites with two in Sadr City. In February more than half of the car bombs were detonated on February 23 when 14 went off across Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salahaddin. A whole range of targets were attacked including the offices of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Salahaddin, the municipal buildings in Kirkuk city, a police station in Diyala and another in Salahaddin, and a school and the Hillah mayor’s office in Babil. For the entire month VBIEDs only went off seven out of 28 days showing that its networks were still very limited at that time. After that surge there were less than twenty attacks per month from March to May. That showed that IS had built up its resources at the end of 2011 to launch these attacks following the U.S. withdrawal. The group not only wanted to hit civilians, but the security forces and government complexes as well. At the same time its networks and resources weren’t strong enough to keep up this level of activity for more than two months. That’s with a huge asterisk for February when more than half of the VBIEDs were used on just one day, the twenty-third. The start of 2012 was a sign of what was to come however.

By the summer of 2012 the Islamic State was able to include a large number of car bombs in its annual offensive. Starting in June IS carried out 41 car bombs, 52 in July, 32 in August, and then 63 in September. For that period the group was able to set off more than one car bomb a day with a high of 2.1 per day average in September. Like the start of the year, a mixture of civilian and government targets was hit. June 13 marked the beginning of the campaign when 23 went off in Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Karbala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salahaddin, and Wasit. Pilgrims were hit in Baghdad’s Karrada and Qriat and Hindiya, Karbala. Three offices of the PUK and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) were also bombed in Kirkuk and Ninewa, along with a police academy in Babil. In total, 79 people lost their lives and 201 were injured on that day. July 23 26 VBIEDs were detonated in Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Qadisiyah, and Salahaddin with 104 killed and 262 wounded. September 9 25 VBIEDs were used and then 16 on September 30. The locations of these car bombings during the summer showed where the Islamic State was attempting to make its comeback. Besides Baghdad, which is always at the very top of targets from June to September Ninewa was struck 16 times, Diyala 21 times, Anbar 24 times, Kirkuk 25 times, and Salahaddin 34 times. There were all the traditional bases for the Islamic State, and showed that within six months of the U.S. pull out it was operationally active in those places once again. The summer offensive also coincided with IS’s first official campaign of the year, which was called “Breaking Walls.” One of its two goals was targeting Shiites in an attempt to restart the civil war. That was shown by the constant attacks upon Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad and the strikes upon pilgrimages.

The very end of 2012 also marked a turning point. For the year IS was able to launch an average of 33.25 VBIEDs per month. In November it set off 43 and then 41 in December. The group never dipped below forty car bombs per month after that. In 2013 for instance it averaged 67.2 and from January to September 2013 it has averaged 75.1. IS was definitely back by the end of 2012 and was on its way to establishing itself as the largest and most effective militant group as the entire insurgency started its revival during that period.

In 2013 IS had built up its resources to the point where it was able to launch several car bomb waves per month, not just one or two days with a large number of explosions like the year before. In January 2012 for example there was only one wave from January 12 to 16. In February there were none. That was following by one in March, and zero in April and May. That finally began to change during the summer offensive when in July there were two from July 3-6 and July 22-25, followed by three in August from August 8-12, August 14-16, and the last from August 27-29, topped off by four in September. That dropped off at the end of the year with one in October, and two each in November and December. That changed in 2013 when there were two to four waves each month. February, March, May, June, July, September, October, and December all had 3-4 waves per month. The fist really long one occurred from March 14-21 when 32 VBIEDs exploded. By the end of 2013 the average number of car bombs per day had more than doubled from 1.0 in 2012 to 2.2 in 2013.

During the summer there was another IS offensive, which actually started a little early in May. Beginning in that month there were 82 VBIEDs, then 59 in June, 88 in July, 80 in August and 93 in September. This was double the number of car bombs it was able to launch during the same months the previous year. This was capped off by its “Soldiers’ Harvest” campaign announced in July. Its two objectives were to attack the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and re-establish its control over territory. The new emphasis upon striking the government forces was seen during the summer. In May for example, an army base, the house of an intelligence officer from the Ninewa Operations Command, three gatherings of the ISF and peshmerga, six checkpoints, and seven patrols were all attacked. In June, eight police stations and army bases were bombed. In July five ISF and peshmerga bases were struck, along with ten patrols. This pattern would continue from the summer into 2014.

At the end of each year IS picks up its car bombings to go after pilgrims. 2013 was no different, but this time it was sustained for the next six months as the Islamic State was preparing for its biggest summer offensive in years. December 2013 there were 84 VBIEDs. That was followed by 93 in January, 104 in February, the most of any month since 2012, then 94 in March, 74 in April, 84 in May, and 70 in June. Again, the ISF were at the top of the list of targets as the insurgents were trying to soften them up in preparation to seize territory in Anbar, and then huge swaths of northern Iraq by the summer. In January five army bases and police stations were bombed. In February, eight checkpoints, six patrols, and two ISF bases were hit. March, ten patrols, nine checkpoints and seven bases were blown up. In April, twelve checkpoints, five bases and stations, and two patrols were targeted. Another new target was the destruction of bridges to limit the ability of the ISF to respond to moves by the Islamic State. In January two bridges were blown up in Anbar. Six were then struck in February, five in March, one in April, and five in June. This was another example of the tactical use of VBIEDs.

Since the June 2014 offensive the number of VBIEDs has actually gone down. After the 70 in June, they went dropped to 41 in July, 56 in August, 60 in September, and 31 so far from October 1-12. The capture of parts of Ninewa, Salahaddin, and Kirkuk, along with most of Anbar meant that traditional targets like Mosul, Tikrit and Fallujah were no longer being hit. At the same time, IS has seized such a huge stockpile of explosives from the Iraqi army that it has the capability to increase these numbers at any time. What it is doing now is launching more waves, but for short durations. In June for instance, there were just two waves, followed by three in July. Then in August there were six waves followed by four in September. The locations also show that the car bombs are being used more and more as tactical weapons in the struggle with the ISF. In August there were 13 in Anbar and four in Salahaddin. In September Anbar was hit six times, Babil seven, and Salahaddin 10, and from October 1-12 Salahaddin received twelve VBIEDs, and Anbar four. These are the frontlines between the insurgents and security forces.

The car bomb has been a key tool in the Islamic State’s attempt to undermine the Iraqi government. It was originally used as a weapon of terror, but has increasingly been employed against public and political offices and the ISF and peshmerga. The latest car bombs for example hit a PUK building in Qara Tapa, Diyala and Federal Police headquarters in Samarra, Salahaddin on October 12. They have succeeded in increasing sectarian tensions as well as Shiite sections of Baghdad are hit each week. The increase in these types of attacks from 2012 to the present also highlights the revival of the Islamic State as an insurgent organization. Many thought the group was dying a slow death by 2011, but it made its comeback in 2012 after the U.S. withdrawal, which was shown by its VBIED attacks. That year it went from being able to launch a huge number of car bombs on a single day to its first wave of such operations. VBIEDs will continue to shape the fighting in Iraq, and a bombing of a key location could set off a full blown sectarian war again as one is brewing in the country. IS has more explosives than ever and the networks to keep up these attacks for years now meaning its total defeat is the only way to stop them from occurring.

Car Bombs In Iraq 2012-2014
Month
2012
2013
2014
Jan
25
40
93
Feb
23
42
104
Mar
19
56
94
Apr
18
54
74
May
17
82
84
Jun
41
59
70
Jul
52
88
41
Aug
32
80
56
Sep
63
93
60
Oct
23
65
Oct 1-12 31
Nov
43
64
-
Dec
41
84
-
Totals
399
807
676

Avg # of Car Bombs Per Day In Iraq 2012-2014
Month
2012
2013
2014
Jan
0.8
1.2
3.0
Feb
0.7
1.5
3.7
Mar
0.6
1.8
3.0
Apr
0.6
1.8
2.4
May
0.5
2.7
2.7
Jun
1.3
1.9
2.3
Jul
1.6
2.8
1.3
Aug
1.0
2.6
18
Sep
2.1
3.1
2.0
Oct
0.7
2.0
-
Nov
1.4
2.1
-
Dec
1.3
2.7
-
Totals
1.0
2.2
2.4

# of Days Per Month With Car Bombs In Iraq 2012-2014
Month
2012
2013
2014
Jan
12
20
27
Feb
7
19
26
Mar
4
19
27
Apr
7
15
26
May
11
21
25
Jun
9
18
19
Jul
12
23
21
Aug
15
17
25
Sep
19
24
21
Oct
21
21
-
Nov
13
19
-
Dec
11
23
-
Totals
141 out of 365
239 out of 365
216 out of 273
Avg.
0.3 car bomb attacks
per day
0.6 car bomb attacks per day
0.7 car bomb attacks per day

Days With 4 Or More Car Bombs In Iraq 2012-2014
Month
2012
2013
2014
Jan
Jan 9 4 VBIEDs
Jan 24 5 VBIEDs
Jan 16 6 VBIEDs
Jan 17 6 VBIEDs
Jan 5 4 VBIEDs
Jan 6 4 VBIEDs
Jan 9 6 VBIEDs
Jan 13 4 VBIEDs
Jan 14 5 VBIEDs
Jan 15 9 VBIEDs
Jan 17 6 VBIEDs
Jan 19 4 VBIEDs
Jan 20 9 VBIEDs
Jan 26 5 VBIEDs
Jan 30 4 VBIEDs
Feb
Feb 23 14 VBIEDs
Feb 29 4 VBIEDs
Feb 8 4 VBIEDs
Feb 17 8 VBIEDs
Feb 26 4 VBIEDs
Feb 28 5 VBIEDs
Feb 1 5 VBIEDs
Feb 3 8 VBIEDs
Feb 4 4 VBIEDs
Feb 5 13 VBIEDs
Feb 6 10 VBIEDs
Feb 16 4 VBIEDs
Feb 17 4 VBIEDs
Feb 18 15 VBIEDs
Feb 22 7 VBIEDs
Feb 25 4 VBIEDs
Mar
Mar 20 13 VBIEDs
Mar 5 4 VBIEDs
Mar 14 4 VBIEDs
Mar 19 20 VBIEDs
Mar 29 7 VBIEDs
Mar 5 5 VBIEDs
Mar 6 10 VBIEDs
Mar 7 5 VBIEDs
Mar 8 4 VBIEDs
Mar 13 6 VBIEDs
Mar 15 8 VBIEDs
Mar 18 11 VBIEDs
Mar 21 6 VBIEDs
Mar 25 4 VBIEDs
Apr
Apr 19 9 VBIEDs
Apr 15 29 VBIEDs
Apr 3 6 VBIEDs
Apr 8 4 VBIEDs
Apr 9 15 VBIEDs
Apr 13 4 VBIEDs
Apr 21 5 VBIEDs
Apr 25 4 VBIEDs
May
None
May 1 4 VBIEDs
May 16 13 VBIEDs
May 20 11 VBIEDs
May 27 7 VBIEDs
May 28 5 VBIEDs
May 30 9 VBIEDs
May 4 4 VBIEDs
May 6 4 VBIEDs
May 10 4 VBIEDs
May 12 4 VBIEDs
May 13 14 VBIEDs
May 15 6 VBIEDs
May 20 4 VBIEDs
May 22 7 VBIEDs
May 24 4 VBIEDs
May 28 7 VBIEDs
Jun
Jun 13 23 VBIEDs
Jun 17 4 VBIEDs
Jun 28 7 VBIEDs
Jun 10 7 VBIEDs
Jun 16 11 VBIEDs
Jun 23 5 VBIEDs
Jun 24 8 VBIEDs
Jun 2 11 VBIEDs
Jun 4 13 VBIEDs
Jun 5 5 VBIEDs
Jun 6 6 VBIEDs
Jun 7 8 VBIEDs
Jun 10 5 VBIEDs
Jun 11 6 VBIEDs
Jul
Jul 3 4 VBIEDs
Jul 22 7 VBIEDs
Jul 23 26 VBIEDs
Jul 29 4 VBIEDs
Jul 2 9 VBIEDs
Jul 11 9 VBIEDs
Jul 12 4 VBIEDs
Jul 14 7 VBIEDs
Jul 20 8 VBIEDs
Jul 29 15 VBIEDs
Jul 19 5 VBIEDs
Aug
Aug 10 10 VBIEDs
Aug 6 5 VBIEDs
Aug 10 16 VBIEDs
Aug 15 7 VBIEDs
Aug 20 4 VBIEDs
Aug 24 4 VBIEDs
Aug 25 5 VBIEDs
Aug 28 11 VBIEDs
Aug 6 5 VBIEDs
Aug 25 4 VBIEDs
Sep
Sep 9 25 VBIEDs
Sep 30 16 VBIEDs
Sep 1 4 VBIEDs
Sep 3 10 VBIEDs
Sep 10 4 VBIEDs
Sep 15 13 VBIEDs
Sep 17 7 VBIEDs
Sep 21 4 VBIEDs
Sep 30 14 VBIEDs
Sep 4 4 VBIEDs
Sep 19 4 VBIEDs
Sep 30 6 VBIEDs
Oct
Oct 15 4 VBIEDs
Oct 27 6 VBIEDs
Oct 2 5 VBIEDs
Oct 5 10 VBIEDs
Oct 13 6 VBIEDs
Oct 17 8 VBIEDs
Oct 27 4 VBIEDs
Oct 7 5 VBIEDs
Oct 11 7 VBIEDs
Nov
Nov 8 4 VBIEDs
Nov 14 8 VBIEDs
Nov 27 9 VBIEDs
Nov 29 5 VBIEDs
Nov 5 4 VBIEDs
Nov 17 6 VBIEDs
Nov 20 6 VBIEDs
Nov 25 4 VBIEDs
Nov 28 12 VBIEDs
-
Dec
Dec 16 4 VBIEDs
Dec 17 13 VBIEDs
Dec 31 8 VBIEDs
Dec 3 4 VBIEDs
Dec 8 13 VBIEDs
Dec 9 4 VBIEDs
Dec 15 7 VBIEDs
Dec 16 10 VBIEDs
Dec 25 5 VBIEDs
Dec 29 4 VBIEDs
Dec 30 10 VBIEDs
Dec 31 5 VBIEDs
-

Location Of Car Bombs In Iraq 2012-2014
Month
2012
2013
2014
Jan
Anbar 1
Diyala 1
Karbala 1
Kirkuk 2
Salahaddin 2
Babil 3
Ninewa 4
Baghdad 10
Anbar 1
Ninewa 2
Baghdad 3
Kirkuk 3
Karbala 4
Babil 5
Diyala 9
Salahaddin 13
Diyala 1
Ninewa 3
Anbar 10
Kirkuk 10
Salahaddin 16
Baghdad 45
Feb
Kirkuk 1
Babil 2
Diyala 2
Ninewa 4
Salahaddin 6
Baghdad 7
Karbala 1
Wasit 1
Babil 3
Kirkuk 3
Diyala 5
Ninewa 6
Salahaddin 6
Baghdad 16
Wasit 1
Kirkuk 2
Babil 7
Diyala 7
Ninewa 15
Anbar 16
Salahaddin 16
Baghdad 34
Mar
Babil 1
Anbar 2
Diyala 2
Karbala 2
Ninewa 2
Kirkuk 3
Salahaddin 3
Baghdad 6
Qadisiyah 1
Basra 2
Diyala 3
Babil 5
Ninewa 5
Kirkuk 6
Salahaddin 8
Baghdad 27
Karbala 1
Kirkuk 2
Wasit 3
Babil 8
Ninewa 13
Salahaddin 13
Anbar 18
Baghdad 29
Apr
Anbar 1
Karbala 1
Kirkuk 2
Ninewa 2
Diyala 3
Salahaddin 3
Baghdad 5
Dhi Qar 1
Karbala 1
Maysan 1
Qadisiyah 1
Wasit 1
Diyala 2
Anbar 3
Babil 4
Ninewa 4
Kirkuk 10
Baghdad 11
Salahaddin 11
Diyala 1
Maysan 1
Muthanna 1
Kirkuk 4
Wasit 4
Anbar 8
Babil 8
Ninewa 10
Salahaddin 11
Baghdad 22
May
Babil 1
Diyala 1
Salahaddin 1
Ninewa 2
Baghdad 6
Anbar 7
Babil 1
Basra 1
Anbar 3
Diyala 4
Kirkuk 7
Salahaddin 7
Ninewa 11
Baghdad 40
Diyala 1
Kirkuk 2
Anbar 12
Salahaddin 14
Ninewa 24
Baghdad 28
Jun
Karbala 1
Wasit 1
Ninewa 2
Babil 3
Diyala 3
Kirkuk 4
Salahaddin 7
Anbar 8
Baghdad 9
Basra 1
Dhi Qar 1
Najaf 1
Diyala 2
Wasit 2
Kirkuk 3
Anbar 5
Babil 5
Salahaddin 6
Ninewa 12
Baghdad 13
Basra 1
Karbala 1
Wasit 1
Dhi Qar 2
Najaf 2
Babil 6
Kirkuk 6
Anbar 7
Diyala 7
Salahaddin 14
Baghdad 16
Jul
Najaf 1
Wasit 1
Karbala 2
Qadisiyah 2
Babil 3
Kirkuk 5
Ninewa 5
Diyala 7
Anbar 8
Salahaddin 9
Baghdad 10
Dhi Qar 1
Karbala 1
Maysan 1
Anbar 2
Muthanna 2
Babil 3
Basra 3
Wasit 4
Diyala 5
Kirkuk 7
Ninewa 11
Salahaddin 14
Baghdad 26
Babil 2
Basra 2
Diyala 3
Salahaddin 6
Anbar 7
Baghdad 15
Aug
Babil 1
Anbar 2
Ninewa 3
Salahaddin 3
Wasit 3
Diyala 4
Kirkuk 4
Baghdad 10
Karbala 1
Maysan 1
Dhi Qar 3
Salahaddin 3
Kirkuk 5
Babil 8
Ninewa 9
Baghdad 40
Karbala 1
Ninewa 1
Wasit 1
Babil 2
Kirkuk 2
Diyala 3
Salahaddin 4
Anbar 13
Baghdad 20
Sep
Basra 1
Maysan 1
Wasit 1
Dhi Qar 2
Babil 3
Diyala 5
Ninewa 5
Anbar 6
Kirkuk 7
Baghdad 14
Salahaddin 15
Basra 1
Dhi Qar 1
Karbala 1
Wasit 1
Babil 3
Anbar 5
Salahaddin 6
Diyala 8
Kirkuk 8
Ninewa 12
Baghdad 40
Basra 1
Kirkuk 1
Najaf 1
Qadisiyah 1
Karbala 3
Anbar 6
Babil 7
Salahaddin 10
Baghdad 17
Oct
Babil 1
Ninewa 1
Anbar 2
Diyala 2
Salahaddin 2
Kirkuk 5
Baghdad 8
Basra 1
Kirkuk 1
Muthanna 1
Qadisiyah 1
Wasit 2
Anbar 3
Babil 3
Diyala 3
Ninewa 3
Salahaddin 11
Baghdad 27
Kirkuk 1
Diyala 2
Anbar 4
Baghdad 6
Salahaddin 12
Nov
Karbala 1
Wasit 1
Diyala 2
Anbar 4
Salahaddin 4
Babil 6
Kirkuk 6
Ninewa 6
Baghdad 7
Basra 1
Muthanna 1
Qadisiyah 1
Wasit 2
Anbar 4
Babil 5
Diyala 5
Kirkuk 5
Ninewa 8
Salahaddin 10
Baghdad 14
-
Dec
Karbala 1
Qadisiyah 1
Anbar 2
Babil 2
Kirkuk 3
Ninewa 3
Baghdad 4
Diyala 11
Salahaddin 13
Diyala 5
Kirkuk 5
Anbar 8
Ninewa 9
Salahaddin 23
Baghdad 34
-

SOURCES

This article is based upon more than two thousand sources. For that reason individual articles are not listed because there are simply too many. The following are specific attacks that were cited in the piece.

AIN, "47 persons killed, injured in Balad," 2/23/12
- "Breaking news…31 civilians killed injured in Kirkuk explosions," 2/23/12
- "Hilla explosion results in killing civilian, injuring 5 others," 2/23/12
- "Urgent….Car bomb goes off in northern Baghdad," 6/13/12
- "Urgent…Child killed, 12 civilians injured eastern Mosul," 5/14/13
- "Urgent….PUK headquarters attacked in Mosul," 6/13/12

Alsumaria, "Wounding two policemen and a civilian in a car bombing in downtown Samarra," 10/12/14

Aswat al-Iraq, "2 car bombs kill 20, injure 38 in Hilla," 6/13/12
- "10 killed, 33 injured in series of blasts in Salah al-Din," 2/23/12
- "15 persons injures as KDP attacked in Kirkuk," 6/13/12
- "Car blows up in Karbala causing several casualties," 1/9/12
- "Coordinated bombs continue, 24 wounded in Karbala," 6/13/12
- "Seven killed, 35 injured in two explosions in Baghdad," 1/9/12
- "Wave of explosions in Baghdad," 1/24/12

Iraq Body Count, "Fifteen by car bomb near Uqba Bin-Nafie Square, Karrada, Baghdad," 6/13/12
- "One by car bomb in Kirkuk," 1/13/12
- "Three by car bomb in al-Hindiya, near Karbala," 6/13/12
- "Three by car bomb in market, near police station, in Baquba," 2/23/12

Karadsheh, Jomana and Tawfeeq, Mohammed, “Iraqi police: 15 killed in attacks on stations,” CNN, 1/15/12

NINA, "73 Killed, wounded in 5 incidents in Baghdad on Monday," 1/9/12
- "BREAKING NEWS Number of casualties from north Tikrit explosion increased up to 15 killed, 22 wounded," 5/11/13

Raheem, Kareem, "Blasts hit Shi'ite pilgrims in Iraq, 15 dead, 52 hurt," Reuters, 1/9/12

Reuters, "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 5," 1/5/12
- "FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 13," 1/13/12

Salaheddin, Sinan and Yacoub, Sameer, "Triple suicide bombing in Iraq kills 58 people," Associated Press, 10/12/14